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There are changes occurring in the demographic composi-
tion of the Soviet population, particularly in the Soviet
armed services which could generate significant internal
stress and hamper effective and efficient military command
and control. The resultant potential consequences could be
decreased morale, lack of troop cohesiveness and decreased
combat readiness with an overall effect being a decline of
the Soviet Union as a world military power.
This thesis will examine language differentials between
the non-Russian recruit and his Russian counterpart. Build-
ing on this foundation idea, however, will be the second,
more complete subject of cultural oppression and ethnic
discrimination as it is manifested today in the USSR.
The value of this study is to suggest possible Soviet
reaction to demographic shifts, effects of growing
nationalistic tendencies in the outlying republics, and
consequences of dissident action as they might all
influence Soviet combat readiness.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Soviet Union sprawls across eleven time zones,
occupies one-sixth of the earth's land surface and contains
more than 100 ethnic strains of people. In 1970, twenty-
two ethnic groups claimed more than one million members
each. It is interesting and appropriate to note that there
have "been recent changes and new emphasis in Soviet society
that reflect prior dormant attitudes of the numerous
ethnic and cultural groups. That emphasis is the equality
of all people under existing law and in the purest form
of Marxist/Leninist philosophy rather than the interpreta-
tion of that philosophy under the current regime. A
prevailing counter-emphasis, however, is Moscow's continuing
policy of Russification of the various national groups,
of cultural assimilation toward the creation of a singular
"Soviet man", and outright demonstration of individual
and group inequalities under existing law as interpreted
by the current regime.
Amalrik (1978) > states that there are five areas of
opposition today in the Soviet Union among both the intel-
lectuals (intelligentsia) and the general populous. First
is national opposition, among such nationality (or ethnic/
cultural) groups as Lithuanians, Georgians, Jews and
Ukrainians whose fundamental goal is to preserve the
national culture and customs within each of the social,
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regional, or religious groups. Next religious opposition,
is one in which there is a sizable population of people
who want to profess and propagandize their religion.
Statistics reveal that greater than 30 percent of the
Soviet population are followers of various religious be-
liefs. Although the political system (i.e. the Soviet
Constitution, Articles 3^ and 52, Atch 2) permits freedom
of religion, the policy is hardly operational! zed. Economic
opposition is one which Amalrik perceives as a resistance
of the majority of workers to their difficult economic
situations which sometimes result in the outbreak of
violence. Cultural opposition is a movement conducted
primarily by the intellectuals for the purpose of enlarging
their freedom of creativity. Some openly challenge the
system (the "system" here is defined as the all encompassing
government structure under full control of the Communist
Party) with resulting consequences of loss of job, lengthy
imprisonment, exile, or mysterious disappearance. Others
try to enlarge their liberties while staying within the
limits of the system. The consequences to this group
operating within system constraints is often the same as
for the group operating outside the system. Finally, the
movement for human rights, emphasizes respect for the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and calls for
a protest to the persecution of people for political,
religious, social, or philosophical opinions. Respect for
the worth of the individual, the belief in an aim that is
8

above the individual (a "belief in certain values outside
our own individual experience. Amalrik, suggest that per-
haps this is, God) and the freedom of choice, to choose
one's fate or destiny, to choose one's own work, political
party, where one wants to live and how one wants to live,
are the basic principles of the human rights movement. (b)
This thesis maintains that it is significant to consider
the cultural opposition and human rights movement not only
in the macro-sociopolitical sense, but also in the micro
perspective, especially in the Soviet armed forces. It is
significant because there is a potential issue developing
within the country and within the military organization
that has its foundation rooted in cultural and ethnic
differentiation which in the broadest sense could impact
the whole of Soviet society, or in a more confined and
narrow view, affect the morale, cohesiveness and the resultant
combat readiness of the Soviet military structure.
This research will substantiate the notion that signifi-
cant decreases, or at least severe inefficiencies in Soviet
combat readiness may be expected in the near future. This
idea is predicated on the following evidence. First, be-
cause of demographic changes occurring within the Soviet
Union, there will be a significant number of non-Russian
(minority group nationality) recruits joining the Soviet
military arms. These new recruits are expected to have
anywhere from little to no ability to communicate effectively
in the primary language, Russian. Language, as a significant

component of one's culture with obvious impacts to effective
command and control will be used as the cornerstones in
discussing future Soviet combat readiness. Building on
these cornerstone ideas, however, is the second, more
complete subject of cultural oppression and ethnic discrimi-
nation as it is manifested today in the Soviet Union.
This paper will consider two separate nationality
groups in the USSR, the Ukrainians and Central Asians.
Three areas will be explored in each group. Nationalistic
movements, in an attempt to preserve cultural heritage and
language; the continuing struggle for freedom of expression,
civil and political liberty, and the open challenge to
the Communist Party based on its professed values, principles
and methods of operation. By examining these areas in
contemporary Ukrainian and Central Asian society, by assuming
that similar actions are occurring to varying degrees in
the other 12 Soviet Socialist Republics and by using Leavitt's
theory or organization (figure 2) this research will con-
clude that the young 18 year old recruit who represents
a non-Russian, minority nationality group will bring into
the military structure from his homeland environment attitudes
and feelings of repression and of discrimination against
him personally and against his whole set of cultural values
and norms. In addition, due to his exposure to various
undercurrents of the human rights movement throughout his
country, any actions by the military organization that
would tend to suppress or retard his concept of human worth
10

and dignity and his capability for future growth and develop-
ment would certainly influence his day-to-day peer and
superior/subordinate interactions to a point that may
severely erode overall cohesion. This would lead eventually
to an ineffective or an inefficient readiness posture.
Language differential by itself and its relationship
to various dissident activities within the USSR will have
a direct impact on the new, multinational cross section of
recruits, their peers and superiors, and they in turn should
have an impact on the Soviet military's technology, structure,
and mission-goals leading finally to a questionable state
of morale and combat readiness.
A statement by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director of the
Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University,
1968, is perhaps an appropriate introduction for the follow-
ing sections of this thesis.
"The Soviet Union is a multinational society.
Fifty percent of the Soviet people are non-Russian.
Among these, the Ukrainians are the most numerous
and potentially the most powerful. It is not
inconceivable that in the next several decades, the
nationality problem will become politically more
important in the Soviet Union than the racial issue
has become in the United States. If that happens,
it will combine the current quest for freedom of
the intellectual community with a greater self-
assertiveness of the non-Russian peoples. While
11

it is impossible to predict where these demands
may lead, the combination of literary ferment
and national self-assertion will be a most potent
one." (11, p. 7)
12

II. THE ETHNO DEMOGRAPHIC DILEMMA OF THE SOVIET UNION
A. ETKNODEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES
There are changes occurring in the composition of the
Soviet population, particularly in the Soviet armed services,
which could, generate significant internal stress and hamper
the future and growth of the Soviet Union as a world military
power. The changes that are occurring are in the ethnodemo-
graphic orientation of the population.
The dynamics and structure of the population of the
USSR show a disparity between the growth rates of the
country's "European" (Slavic and Baltic) nationalities and
the growth rates of its "non-European" (Transcaucasian
and Central Asian) nationalities (figure 1) . The current
and projected growth rate for the USSR shows an average
increase of approximately 1
.
1% per annum while the growth
rate for the republics has risen from 11.5% in 1959, to
approximately 17% in 1977 and is estimated to level off at
13-16$ by the end of this century. (Appendix A identifies
the separate and distinct geographical republics that
constitute the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.




B. IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION GROWTH RATE DIFFERENTIALS
TO SOVIET SOCIETY AND TO THE SOVIET MILITARY
There are several profound implications which might
"be derived from this rate differential. First, by the
late 1980' s and certainly by the year 2000, there will not
be enough "European" entrants into the industrial workforce
to replace those that are retiring. Complicating this
issue, there is substantial evidence that there is no
mass migration of "non-Europeans" from rural areas into
the cities. The essence of this situation is that in the
absence of migration the sizable labor force reservior
lies in Central Asia, which is remote from where most of
Soviet industry is now located.
Unless there is a dramatic increase in labor productivity,
which is unlikely, the country will either have to shift
its industrial inertia eastward toward the semi -developed
republics of Central Asia or mobilise the presently non-
migratory natives of those republics for work in other
regions. Either choice of action will result in significant
national changes affecting not only economics and politics
but society as well. Industralizing the outer republics,
or mobilizing them toward the existing industrial centers
could certainly have immediate and perhaps long-lasting
ethnic, cultural and organizational effects leading to
social evolution or, if dramatic enough, social revolution.
Another implication of the slowdown in growth rate is
the conscription of able-bodied males (defined by the Soviets
14

as 18 year olds) into the armed services (Table 1). There
are three points to consider here. First, to maintain
existing manning levels considering current/projected
retention rates and the current two year/three year service
obligation, the Soviets will have to recruit heavily from
Central Asia. Second, this particular group is also in
demand by the general economy, and projections indicate
there will be insufficient able-bodied males to go around
if the military maintains current manning levels. Third,
the probability of heavy recruitment from Central Asia
implies a significant military population of poorly educated,
unskilled peasants that have insufficient command of spoken
Russian . The potential cultural and racial issues involving
these latter variables are the primary issues to be addressed
by this research.
This research appears to be somewhat original in
approaching some anticipated racial and cultural issues
that will confront the Soviet armed services in the
approaching decades. Recognized authorities in Soviet
affairs predict little likelihood that protests of emergent
minority nationalities will rise to unmanageable levels.
These authorities feel that future society-wide reactions
will be characterized by "more numerous acts of individual
and small group terrorism, more massive protest demonstra-
tions and more extensive public dissent. There will be no
large communal uprisings or national insurgencies." (6)
From this and other such statements, it is inferred that
15

Western observers should not expect significant societal
effects at the macro socioeconomic level. These same
authorities, however, do not appear to consider the minority
implications at a more micro organizational level, especially
within the armed services. This research will illustrate
the cause and effect relationships of racial tension and
confrontation to Soviet military effectiveness and efficiency
and justify the conclusion that protests and demonstrations
will in fact be significant at least with respect to
military readiness.
Considering the emergence of ethnic or national
consciousness, the decreasing population growth rate,
military manning levels and general economic and political
requirements, the Soviet Union, and especially the Soviet
military, can expect racial conflict and confrontation of
perhaps extraordinary proportion if they do not develop
a healthy organizational climate and an integrated pool
of satisfied and motivated human resources.
C. DATA: SOURCE AND DERIVATION
All of the population growth rates through 1970 are
based on current and corresponding census volumes. All
estimates and projections of population demographics were
based on data by the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division
of the U.S. Census Bureau. Their estimates were based on
the age-sex distributions from the 1959 and 1970 censuses
16

and official figures for total population, births and
deaths for the years 1950-7^- The projections for the
years 1975-2000 were based on the assumption that fertility
will decline by seven percent between the years 1975-2000,
that mortality will decline by an amount equivalent to an
increase in life expectancy at birth of approximately 2.5
years, and that net migration from outer republics will be
insignificant
.
The actual size of the Soviet armed forces remains a
vital question. Table 1, reflects a constant figure of
b.5 million (see note for computing value of column 6,
Table 1) obtained from the International Institute for
Strategic Studies of London, England. (Estimates range
from a low of three million to as high as six million or
more). Since the 1950' s, the Institute's estimates of
manning in the armed services for all countries has been
the most authoritative available.
The retention statistic used to build the hypothetical
model of available 18 year-olds for the military and for
the economy (Table 1) was obtained from an unpublished
manuscript entitled, "Soviet Military Compensation and
Conscription: An Economic and Statistical Analysis,"
University of Wisconsin, 1973-
17

D. AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS AND
SOME POSSIBLE SOVIET REACTIONS
By the end of this century, between 20 and 25 percent
of the Soviet population and almost ^-0 percent of its
teenagers and young adults will be "non-Europeans" of whom
the vast majority will be Central Asians (Table 2) . Com-
bined with these data, Table 1 reflects the availability
of able-bodied males for conscription into the armed services
and the "leftovers" available for the economy. (The
ethnodemographic makeup of the Soviet economy is a separate
consideration for evaluation beyond this research; however,
much of what is evaluated and concluded for the Soviet
armed services would be applicable to the general economy)
.
The fact that by the year 2000, forty percent of the
teenagers will be "non-Europeans" with poor command of the
Russian language is one issue. (6, p5) What makes this
problem so acute now in the Soviet armed forces and perhaps
later in resolving the overall labor force composition is
the growth of ethnic or national consciousness. The
people are developing pride and loyalty to their heritage,
to their republic and/or autonomic regions. Attempts at
ignoring, not acknowledging and responding, or reducing this
consciousness by acculturation and assimilation into the
dominatly nationalized, Russified, military structure may
well affect discipline, esprit, training, and overall
military effectiveness. For example, in fulfilling their
service commitments, the new draftees may encounter for
18

the first time in their lives a living and working relation-
ship with other nationalities. Feelings of inferiority
and social isolation to his "European" counterpart may
well result from not being able to communicate with poor
or non-existent knowledge of Russian. As an additional
consequence of the language barrier, the "non-European"
recruit will have difficulty in learning military regula-
tions, acquiring a military speciality, and responding to
an officer corps made up of primarily the dominant Russian
speaking nationality. These feelings of being "second-rate
citizens" may well be the catalysts of ineffectiveness and
possible confrontations between the "non-European" and
"European" nationalities in the near term and may well
color individual racial attitudes, on both sides for life.
The ultimate and immediate consequence here would be the
resulting decrease in cohesiveness one would expect in the
armed services in times of crisis. (32, p^)
E. THE SOVIET AWARENESS OF LANGUAGE DIFFERENTIALS
Sheehy (1978), put into historical perspective Soviet
internationalism with respect to language differentials in
the military. "Language was apparently not a major problem
in the Red Army during the first two decades subsequent
to the Russian Revolution. At that time, many non-Russians
served in so-called national military formations, which
had come into being during the civil war. In these units,
the commands were given in Russian, but mass propaganda
19

work was conducted in the native language of the majority.
The situation changed on March 7, 1938 i when the national
units were abolished and it was decided that all units
should in the future he multinational. Soviet sources
imply that this move was part of a reorganization of the
armed forces following the adoption of the Soviet Constitu-
tion in 1936. The real reason was probably Stalin's doubts
about the ultimate loyalty of the national units in face
of the growing threat from Nazi Germany. In any event,
their abolution took place at the very time when Hitler
was in the process of swallowing Austria. Six days later,
in a move that ran directly counter to Lenin's view that
other nationalities should not be compelled to learn
Russian , the teaching of Russian was made mandatory in all
non-Russian schools. (Emphasis supplied by this author).
Little more than three years after it had been intro-
duced, the new policy of ethnically-mixed units faced a
severe challenge when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in
June, 19^1. Knowledge of Russian was still extremely
limited in certain areas, and in the emergency conditions
of wartime, Moscow found itself forced to reestablish the
national units, particularly in the Central Asian republics
and Azerbaijan. It was, however, mainly those whose
Russian was minimal or non-existent who were drafted into
the national units, the rest going into ordinary regiments.
20

The national units did not survive the war and doubts
about the loyalty of Soviet citizens following the
experiences of World War II, combined with the rise in
national consciousness among the non-Russian peoples of
the USSR in recent years, effectively preclude the
possibility of their ever being revived by the present
Soviet Regime.
Today, the Soviet military authorities have a vital
stake in the effectiveness of Russian language teaching be-
cause of their acute awareness of their policy of universal
conscription, a future deficiency of able-bodied recruits,
and the trend toward ethnically mixed units. Their campaign
to make Russian the "second mother tongue" has involved
extending the teaching of Russian even into the kindergartens
The efforts expended in the school system seem not by
themselves to have produced the desired results. Sheehy,
continues to examine the Soviet effort outside the school
system.
"Efforts to remedy conscripts' lack of Russian have
not been confined to "che school system. The resolution
of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council
NOTE: Emphasis supplied by this author is based on Sheehy'
s
historical data that during the war over a million Soviet
citizens, both Russian and non-Russian, who were taken
prisoner, deserted or found themselves under enemy occupation,
enlisted for various reasons in military formations of the
Whermacht. Perhaps one reason for the cross-over of loyalty
was due to cultural and ethnic discrimination, and in general
lack of perceived level of necessary civil liberty.
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of Ministers of July 20, 1964, "On Measures for Further
Improving the Preparation of Young People of pre-Draft
and Draft Age for Service in the Armed Forces of the USSR"
called on the Union republics not only to improve the
teaching of Russian in non-Russian schools but also to
offer the utmost assistance to those of pre-draft age with
a poor knowledge of Russian by organizing circles, seminars
and tutoring facilities for the study of Russian at their
places of work.
Eleven years later, a resolution of the Uzbek Central
Committee on the teaching of Russian recommended that short
Russian language courses be organized for those of pre-
draft age. In 1972, the Ministry of Defense itself took
steps to improve the Russian of serving soldiers by publish-
ing a Russian primer "for soldiers with very little or no
knowledge of Russian." This aimed to provide the minimum
needed to understand commands and orders and the expressions
most commonly used in military life, and to read and conduct
simple conversations in Russian. At the same time or
earlier, groups were organized in units to study Russian
for one or two hours daily, and Komsomol activists were
detailed to assist individual soldiers whose Russian was
weak.
To judge by the state of affairs described in the
latest issue of Russky yazyk v natsional ' noi shkole ,
Abuzyarov indicates that neither of these efforts nor the
measures taken in schools have as yet borne much fruit.
22

Abuzyzrov, bases his findings on: the answers to question-
naires filled in by army officers and officials of military
enlistment and registration offices; the personal observa-
tions of a member of the institute's staff during his own
period of military service in 1975-76; and tests of the
vocabulary and comprehension of draftees from remote
villages in Ural'sk Oblast and of soldiers with secondary
education after three, six, and twelve months service. His
findings indicate that the Russian of some draftees is at
best rudimentary, that it improves little, if at all, in
the forces, and that this state of affairs certainly does
not improve morale. Sheehy quotes Abuzyarov:
"The study showed that graduates of national
schools that lacked' a Russian language environ-
ment enter the army with inadequate linguistic
preparation. Most of them are not always able
to name such simple words as rank", "column", and
"right marker" , which are frequently encountered
in the elementary training handbook. Given ten
words encountered in the elementary military
training handbook, each of the raw recruits
composed sentences averaging two or three words,
but not always correctly.
Servicemen were also found to have insufficient
comprehension of such words and phrases as "oath",
"obey unquestioningly" , and "honorable duty".
Having learnt certain articles of regulations by
heart, soldiers in their first year of service
cannot always explain a given point of an article.
Typical of the mistakes such servicemen make:
"Guard commander, stand fast; remainder, advance!"
instead of "Guard Commander, advance; remainder,
stand fast!". It takes a long time before
graduates of national schools can be given
responsible assignments and as time goes on




This is "bound to affect the morale of servicemen;
poor knowledge of Russian often leads to depression
and sometimes engenders a negative attitude towards
military service."
Indeed, one can expect somewhat dramatic organizational
consequences to language barriers in such obvious areas
as communication (i.e. the time involved from the issuance
of an order or directive to its accurate execution)
,
problem solving and decision making. One might also
speculate on more subtle organizational issues such as
peer relationships, team emphasis, team coordination, work
facilitation, support, supervisory/subordinate relation-
ships, personal development and growth, and overall individual
satisfaction to his work. Combine these feelings with an
external environment that is beginning to emphasize the
issue of human rights, cultural heritage, and full self-
expression of beliefs and values, and a volatile situation
could be created.
Sheeny, thoroughly summarizes the issue of language
differentials, mixed ethnic military units, and minority
discrimination. "The effect of demographic developments
on the ethnic composition of the draft is aggravated by
the fact that it is precisely among those nationalities
who are providing an ever increasing proportion of draftees
that knowledge of Russian tends to be least adequate . An
analysis of the 1970 census data for various age groups
shows that at that time only 24 percent of Georgians,
28 percent of Azerbaijani, and between 30 and 35 percent
24

of Uzbeks, Turkmans, and Tajiks in the 16-19 age group
claimed a good knowledge of Russian. It is true that
these findings include both sexes, that many more may have
had some knowledge of Russian, and that Soviet ethnographers
have maintained that knowledge of Russian among at least
some of the non-Russian nationalities is greater than
the census data would suggest. Even so, it is clear that
the number of draftees who start their military service
without adequate Russian must be considerable."
F. WHAT LIES AHEAD
Demographic statistics of current and projected man-
power resources for the Soviet economy and armed forces
clearly show a deficiency in available 13 year olds, at
least from the "European" republics with Russian speaking
ability. To fulfill future military manning requirements,
and perhaps overall civilian economic requirements, the
Soviet Union will probably recruit great numbers of non-
Russian speaking men and women into service of their
country.
It is perhaps appropriate to introduce Leavitt's
theory of organization to gain a perspective on the
interrelationships between an organization's task and
goals, its structure, its technology and its people
(figure 3) , as theory is applied to the situation that is
beginning to exist in the Soviet Union.
25

Affecting all of these organizational mechanisms is
the environment in which the organization exists. A
modification is added to Leavitt's model by creating the
additional dimension of, output, or in the case of the
military, combat readiness.
If one considers the effects of a dominant, language-
peculiar hierarchy of authority (i.e. the Soviet officer
corps and senior enlisted) in control of a subordinate
force made up of people with varying degrees of inability
to communicate in the "power language" and living in an
environment that is beginning to stress an importance on
human rights and cultural heritage, several dynamic and
profound impacts may be felt in the area of organizational
structure and combat readiness. For example, without a
common language base the volumes of military rules,
regulations, technical publications, strategies and Party
doctrine and propaganda efforts, may have to be translated
into numerous languages and dialects. There would perhaps
be a requirement to completely reorganize the military's
operational and administrative hierarchial structure to
accomodate the new majority, i.e. a return to military
federalism. The idea is suggested even though it is
apparently threatening to the centralization of Party
power politics by the current administration. Because
of the two to three year active duty service commitment
combined with a current 75 percent attrition rate, more
new people will constantly be in the basic and skill training
26

pipeline. Another potential complication considering this
issue might be a commensurately longer time allocated for
such orientation and indoctrination because of more time
required by the recruit to read, translate and absorb the
new materials.
Of equal, or perhaps greater concern is the affect of
people, these minority nationalities, on the Soviet military
organization. A new recruit living in a foreign culture,
surrounded by extremes in authority and discipline, not
being able to fully understand all the subtleties in
communication, unable to express himself, and experiencing
various forms and degrees of ethnic and cultural discrimi-
nation, may be expected to demonstrate a wide range of
psychological and emotional mal -adjustments , resulting in
overall organizational inefficiency and ineffectiveness.
One would expect for example a Central Asian to have low
morale, little motivation (intrinsic at least), little
team coordination, poor peer relationships, and his indivi-
dual needs greatly conflicting with organizational needs.
He perhaps would also experience little job satisfaction,
have little opportunity for personal growth and development,
have poor promotion potential, and might even experience
disproportionate punishment or reprimands, all resulting
from his new military relationships, his inability to





These emotional or psychological feelings have a great
potential to be operationalized especially when one considers
the envelop of "environment" (figure 3) • Considering the
dissident movement in the Soviet Union that campaigns for
civil, political and overall human rights, the growing
nationalistic consciousness in the outlying republics and
their emphasis on cultural and ethnic autonomy, future
growth and development, what might happen if the traditional
military structure attempts to acculturate and Russify
their new recruits, under traditional means when this
population of human beings represents almost 50 percent of
the entire force and thinks in terms of civil rights,
cultural freedom and full self-expression?
Russification of nationalities in a macroperspective
will be examined in the next section by drawing on the
Hungarian Revolution and the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Moscow's invasion of human rights and resultant national
discord will also be examined in Chapter three by studying
the Ukraine and Central Asian regions of the Soviet Union.
28

III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
"History always brings things into clear waters ... experiments
with the undercutting of roots, experiments with the




A. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PEOPLE AND NATIONS
"One of the most significant gains of socialism is the
solution of the nationality problem in the USSR. The first
step in this direction was the establishment of legal
equality of all nations, nationalities and ethnic groups
inhabiting the country. On November 15, 1917 » the Soviet
Government adopted a "Declaration of Rights of the Peoples
of Russia" . It declared the basic principles of the
national policy of the first socialist state - equality and
sovereignty of the nations, their right to free self-
determination to the point of seceding and forming indepen-
dent states, abolition of all national and national-
religious privileges and restrictions, and free development
of the national minorities and groups.
The right of nations to self-determination established
for the first time in history, a fundamentally new type of
relations between nationalities based on equality, friend-




The principles of fraternal friendship and cooperation,
of equality and sovereignty of nations and free development
of national minorities and ethnic groups are but a few of
the ideologies expressed by V.I. Lenin and reflected in
the Soviet Constitution of 192^. The new constitution
(1977) defines the USSR as "an integral, federal, multi-
national state formed on the principle of socialist federalism
as a result of the free self determination of nations and
the voluntary association of equal republics". The new
constitution continues to reflect appropriate Marxist/
Leninist doctrine and considerably extends the soverign
rights of the Union Republics and strengthens their guarantee
to exercise those rights. For example, the 1977 constitution
permits any republic to retain the right of free secession
from the USSR, and to have their own constitution,
corresponding to the Constitution of the USSR. They have
the right to ensure comprehensive economic and social
development, enter into relations with foreign states, and
exchange diplomatic and consular representatives (Atch 2)
.
It is the existence of these individual rights and
freedoms and their outright, flagrant violations by
various levels of Soviet Government, expecially the enforce-
ment arm of the state, the KGB and the court system, that
provide a causal relationship and catalytic force to the
human rights movement within the Soviet Republics. Further,
the emphasis on human rights, on an individual's civil and
political liberty and on the growth and development of
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national cultural heritage and traditions are the
environmental factors which help develop the basic notion
that all of this could lead to a Soviet version of the
Kitty Hawk/Constellation incidents, isolated to a company
or brigade level or perhaps contribute to the overall demise
of troop cohesion, combat readiness and overall status of
world Soviet military power.
This chapter will discuss some contemporary minority
discrimination issues within Soviet society which are
assumed to be pervasive in the military structure also.
Specifically this chapter will emphasize the Kremlin's
attitude and philosophy towards two significant populations,
the Ukrainians and Central Asians, and, on historical
incidents, primarily the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia,
that will confirm the suspicion that the Soviet bureaucracy
does not practice exactly what it preaches. It will show
that this dichotomy of policy versus action-performance
is actually responded to and manifested not only in
dissident action, but even in the behavior of the Slavic
soldier as was demonstrated during the Czech invasion.
Before exploring the activities and events in section
C, the next section will introduce the thought and evolution




B. DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION:
A COMPARISON
Ethnic discrimination can be avoided in societies if
the oppressed acquiesce in their status, if the oppressors
go about the business of oppression with untroubled
conscience, and if the techniques and institutions of
oppression function efficiently. However, let the exploited
no longer accept their lot as legitimate or unalterable,
let the powerholding elite no longer affirm the legitimacy
of discrimination, or let the machinery of supressing
discontent become inefficient and a societal reaction
results that has the potential of permeating throughout
all economic, cultural and political institutions and
processes. (20)
The black-white conflict in the United States is an
example of this process in action. Blacks have no longer
accepted low economic, social and political status and
limited opportunities for personal growth and development.
Their resistance has therefore brought to an end the
apparent equilibrium between those subject to repression
and those imposing it. The result has been social con-
flict manifesting itself in incidents ranging from slum
riots, black revolutionary groups and voter registration
drives in the South to struggle over community control
of schools in the North, Black Studies programs in many
schools, and more pressures for ethnic quotas in business,
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industry and military establishments. The affirmative
action programs are examples.
To a degree, there is a parallel between the Black
movement in America and the dissident reaction in the
Soviet Union with respect to the dichotomy between cultural
values and actual practices of discrimination and repression.
The Constitution of the United States affirms and promises
equality of opportunity for all, when in fact until the
early 1960s, it permitted federal, state and local
bureaucracies to commit flagrant violations towards Blacks
of this most basic American cultural value. The Soviet
Constitution also mandates such cultural value by clearly
stating the "citizens of the USSR are equal before law,
regardless of their origin, social status and property,
nationality and race, sex, education, language, attitude
toward religion. .. or other particulars" (Article 3*0- As
will be shown, however, there is a glaring discrepancy
between constitutional guarantee and practice in the Soviet
Union, as there was in America. When there is such conflict
between the ideal and the actual conditions, the difference
has a great tendency to undermine the authenticity of the
entire value system and the social and political institu-
tions supposedly based on it.
C. REPRESSION IN UKRAINE
In the Soviet Union there is no group comparable in
accumulated disadvantage as the Black American and no long
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standing victimization of any ethnic group on the same
scale. There are however, numerous examples of minority
discrimination. For example, the government demands
unconditional loyalty toward the Union and the slightest
tendency toward nationalistic self-assertion or even
consciousness is viewed and treated with much severity.
Also, Russian peoples are encouraged to move into non-
Russian republics or autonomous territories to "improve
the overall state of social and political affairs" . The
result, however, is disharmony and ethnic imbalance. Per-
haps one of the most significant examples of Soviet
discrimination of a particular nationality group is the
attitude and treatment of the people in the Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic.
The Ukrainian population of the Soviet Union numbers
some forty million; of these about thirty million reside
in the geographical area of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic. Like the citizens of other Soviet Republics, the
people of the Ukraine are guaranteed by Article 50 of the
Soviet Constitution freedom of speech, press, assembly,
meetings, street processions and demonstrations. In the
I960' s however, numerous Ukrainian intellectuals suspected
of concern with the future interests of Ukrainian cultural
and ethnic identity were subjected to various forms of
punishment. Since then it has been demonstrated time and
time again that the political authorities in Moscow and
in Kiev, the capital of the Ukrainian Republic, do not
3^

fully share the same perspectives on cultural and political
life in Ukraine today which guide the actions of writers,
journalists, teachers and scientists. Government harass-
ment has taken the form of house searches, threats,
interrogations, official propaganda campaigns against
"bourgeois nationalism", secret and semisecret trials and
sentences to corrective labor camps located on the territory
of the Russian, rather than the Ukrainian Republic (emphasis
by V. Chornovil)
.
Chornovil notes that "whenever someone critizes the
current nationality policy for its deviation from Lenin's
standards (even if erroneously), he is fully entitled to
do so by the Constitution of the USSR. On the strength
of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, however, this
person can and is often banished to a hard labor camp be-
cause his criticism may be intepreted as 'propaganda for
the purpose of undermining or weakening the Soviet rule*
(although in actual fact, the moral health of this very
rule is at stake)."
Fredrick Barghoorn of Yale University notes that the
dissident Ukrainian intellectuals defend their actions not
in terms of "bourgeois" principles but in terms of
Leninsim and the Soviet Constitution. The dissidents argue
that both the laws and the procedures employed against
them by the KGB and the courts violate what they perceive
as Lenin's conception of the rights of all people to
cultural freedom and civil liberties.
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It appears that the Ukrainian intellectuals have a
three fold purpose in their dissident effort. The central
feature of their movement is to perserve the Ukrainian
culture heritage and language (e.g. Dissenting Ukrainian
intellectuals have identified the unequal and limited
opportunities for Ukrainian children to study their own
language, to the declining number of Ukrainian schools,
and to the relegation of the Ukrainian language to a
secondary position in higher education. (20, p3^6) In
addition, their struggle is a contribution to the nation-
wide fight for freedom of expression and civil rights, and
a challenge to the system based on its professed values,
principles and actions.
Barghoorn, in his prefacing remarks to The Chornovil
Papers , makes several interesting comments that relate to
Leavitt's diamond (figure 3) » specifically the affects of
the environment (government) on the organization (society).
"The rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Soviet Constitu-
tion are nullified by some of the most basic facts of
Soviet political life. Although on paper the Soviet Union
is a federal state, in practice it is a rigidly centralized
dictatorship, in which control is exercised by the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a national rather than
a federative organization, with headquarters in Moscow."
Specifically regarding the treatment of the various national
groups, ". . .in the post-Stalin era, up to about 1958*
Moscow's controls over the non-Russian nationalities were
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relaxed. There was a resurgence of use of the native
languages in education and administration. However, in
1958-59, Russification policies were again accelerated in
the schools and political leaders who had apparently
opposed such policies and generally sought to champion
minority interests against Moscow were removed from office.
The program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
adopted in 1961, promised the continued economic and
cultural development of all peoples of the Soviet Union.
However, it seemed to strike a centralist, anti -pluralist
note, especially in its statement that the boundaries
between the constituent republics were increasingly
losing their former significance and its emphasis upon the
significance for all of the Soviet peoples of Russian
language and culture." (11, pXVI
)
Chornovil, thoroughly reviews and examines his and
other Ukrainian dissident efforts and government reactions
from data accumulated a decade ago. Discrimination goes on
today such as in the case of Yosyp Terelya, a 3^ year old
dissident poet whom Anderson describes as a Ukrainian, proud
of his culture and traditions and as a devout member of the
Ukrainian Uniate Church which places God as head of the
state. The biographical sketch continues by detailing
NOTE: The Uniate Church is an Eastern Rite Catholic Church
which is differentiated from the orthodox church in that
it recognizes the Pope as the head of the church.
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Terelya's imprisonment that occurred as a result of his
advocacy of an individual's worth and dignity and express-
ing the growing sentiments of Ukrainian nationalism. (5)
Another example of discrimination and feelings of
nationalism is the case of General Samuel A. Jaskilka,
former assistant commandant of the United States Marine
Corps. Jaskilka, though not exactly a Ukrainian dissenter,
has a Ukrainian heritage and implies that there is a
significant division among the peoples of the Soviet Union,
based on a growing national consciousness in the various
republics. The anecdotal evidence is said to have
originated in a Washington meeting between Jaskilka and a
Soviet official, Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin. The
General's point during the ensuing conversation was that
if you go to Lithuania or Estonia or a "hundred places and
ask a man or woman what they are, they won't tell you they
are Russian." (38) Jaskilka, Terelya, Chornovil and
others emphasize that efforts at nationalistic discrimi-
nation and repression of cultural heritage and tradition
through programs of Russification of the republics is
viewed as an infringement upon civil rights and the freedom
of full self expression.
Chornovil, reflecting on the human rights movement in
Ukraine, and perhaps the entire country, asks a rhetorical
question of the reader. "Is it possible that non-Marxists
have absorbed better than our leaders the Marxist-Leninist
thesis that revolutions and social-economic changes are
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not exported, that an idea can be implanted on new soil
only when all the social, economic and political pre-
requisites are completely ripe for it, and that to forbid
the spreading of ideas is to increase their strength and
attractiveness?
"
What additional momentum might be expected in the socio-
political environment of the country if the government
continues to stifle a perhaps growing nationalistic and
human rights emphasis? The same question may be asked
considering the affect of such movements and such repressive
government reactions on the future effectiveness and co-
hesiveness of the Soviet Armed Forces. One would expect
the non-Russian recruit to bring into his new work and new
associations a belief and value system that was a product
of his former environment. A continued policy of in-service
Russification, of cultural repression and ethnic discrimi-
nation in a force composition representing a near ^0 percent
minority cross section could well lead to a troubled and
volatile situation.
"History has more than once refuted the Jesuit
principle of, 'the end justifying the means'. The most
equitable society cannot be built by terror and suppression
of people's civil impulses. The dialectics of history are
implacable; improper means distort the end, and the






D. MOSCOW ATTITUDE TOWARD CENTRAL ASIANS
"The ability to communicate is not a linguistic matter
entirely. Communication by words depends to a great de-
gree on common language, but many other factors are involved.
Two dialects of the same language may be mutually incom-
prehensible, depending on social, political and historical
factors
.
Russian is the first language of Kazakhstan and in
every case it is the second language of each of the non-
Russian nationalities of Central Asia . . . there is little
doubt that political considerations have supervened in
the division of Central Asia into nationalities each with
separate republics and languages." (22, p. 46)
Language differential is again used as the foundation
for identifying a more inclusive and comprehensive social
reaction to political, cultural and ethnic discrimination
within the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union.
The national groups in the Central Asian bloc are the
Kazakh, Turkmen, Uzbek, Kirgiz and Tadzhik Soviet Socialist
Republics. They constitute a population of Soviet citizens
that has accepted and benefited from government collectivi-
zation of agriculture, greater industralization and standard
of living benefits, but they have in the past and continue
today to resist acquiring a complete and true Soviet
cultural perspective. Their attitudes and behaviors are
still strongly influenced by years of tradition and heritage,
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and their social and cultural estrangement from the Russians
has even been accompanied by a new (or renewed sense of
hostility) toward other asian groups. (19, p.27^)
Bacon (1966) concludes that although great changes
have occurred in Central Asian cultures within the last
century, the Central Asian peoples have not lost their
sense of ethnic identity, nor are they liekly to become
merged with the Russian people. "There has been an
evolution of the traditional cultures, with selective
borrowings of new elements and modifications congenial to
the traditional patterns and interests of the area." (7)
Harnstone (1970) clearly indicates that the "new
Soviet Tadzik" (or perhaps Uzbek, Kirgiz, Kazakh, Turkmen,
or any nationality group) has begun to emerge within the
culturally aware elite, but differs greatly from the "Homo
Sovieticus" of Lenin's dream. His loyalty to the All-
Union goals is weakened by his sense of separate identity
(emphasis by author) which also makes him feel different
from his brothers in other parts of the USSR . . . and,
as far as Russification and the degree of acculturation is
concerned, the price is usually alienation from the
traditional community.
The people of Central Asia do not have ownership i.e.
the need, want or understanding, of the belief and value
system imposed on them by Moscow. They don't have owner-
ship of the Russification idea and they can't identify
with the system, its content or its processes. If a
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planned change effort is to ever be successful the client
system, in this case the Central Asians, must develop
internally the concept of ownership of the planned change,
i.e. Moscow's attempts at Russification. They have however,
accepted and adapted to Soviet policy, rules and regulations
They support projects that benefit them, but passively
resist those that impose on their well-being or elude their
comprehension. Bacon, further elaborates on Central Asian
acquiescence to "European" demands: "they have been
selective in their borrowings of new elements and have
modified these to fit into their own way of thinking and
behaving. Such proferred elements as do not fit into
their own patterns are rejected. They have learned to
follow quietly their own cultural inclinations despite
legal enactments and urging of agitators. What is perhaps
genuine contempt is veiled by an appearance of outward
submission That somehow suggests inner awareness of a
culture and an outlook on life vastly older than that of
the Soviets.
"
Further complicating a growing national separatism with
respect to Central Asia is the idea of centralized decision
making in Moscow. It is the Russians who dominate the
decision making bodies of the CPSU and All Union government,
and it is primarily the Russians who represent the central
Party and government apparatus in the borderlands. Local
resentment of centrally determined policies and resource
allocation, and for the proverbial All Union disregard for
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local needs, requirements, and aspirations blend with
elements of ethnic hatred and cultural alienation that
perhaps may create a volatile social condition.
What does Moscow think about the Central Asians?
Harnstone , believes that the Soviets consider the sociali-
zation process (Russification) to be a failure. "It has
not succeeded in transforming them into model Soviet men,
i.e. it has not made them into good Russians." (19, p. 289)
One could conclude, therefore that there would be little
transfer of economic or political power from Russian to
Central Asian hands even within the Party structure because
locally determined criteria would certainly take precedence
over All Union ones as guidelines in local decision making,
and Moscow would experience a perceived or real loss of
control over critical borderland republics.
It is the subtle resistance of the people in Central
Asia to further Russification efforts and their hostility
towards centralized social, economic and political decision
making that will perhaps provide an explosive environment
to organizational (military) effectiveness and efficiency.
Returning again to Leavitt's diamond, one might expect
that the Central Asian recruit's external environment,
opposition to cultural oppression, a belief and value
system towards Russians which is neither supportive or
trusting, plus effects of the recruit's internal environ-
ment, i.e. cultural and ethnic hatred and discrimination
not only between Russians and Central Asians, but among
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the Central Asians themselves in the company, batallion or
regiment could result in an action or reaction by the
"people" part of the diamond which could affect either in
the short or long term, Soviet combat readiness.
"Today in Central Asia there is a new sense of narodnost'
identity. (Narodnost' is usually translated as "nationality"
meaning an ethnic group, such as Uzbek, Turkoman, or Takzhik)
,
and during the more than forty years of Soviet rule, there
has been a drawing together ( sblizhnost
'
) of subgroups to
create some feeling of nationality. There has been little
sblizhnost' between Central Asians and Russians." (19)
E. THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
"Our aim is freedom of the individual, sovereignty of the
nation and democratic socialism."
the Czech poet, Jaroslav Seifert
Prior to 1968, Czechoslovakia was attempting a major
change in the social and political processes of Communism
that had evolved under Stalin. Specifically, the country
was attempting to create "a socialism with a human face"
or in the words of Dubcek (the First Secretary of the
Czech Communist Party), "to Humanize Marxism."
The objectives of the Dubcek regime prior to August
20, 1968 were to achieve new levels of personal justice
and national freedom, to eliminate national, social and
political suppression, to grant the right of dissent, to
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promote an unhampered flow of ideas and to create the
capability of each national party to make its own decisions.
This particular chapter of history, the build-up and
final Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which was designed
to quell Dubcek's reforms, is included in this analysis
of Soviet discrimination of non-Russian nationalities be-
cause it clearly represents one country's reaction to
national, economic, and cultural oppression and an overall
movement to encourage and develop basic human rights. The
philosophy of humanizing, liberalizing, democratizing and
nationalizing socialism under the Dubcek regime closely
parallels the prevailing dissident movement today within
the boundaries of the USSR, and summarizes some of the
feelings and attitudes toward Russification as demonstrated
by the various nationality groups in the outlying republics.
This section will briefly review three attempts at
"humanizing" Communism with emphasis on the causal effects
of the Sovie~ invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
There was much happening in the Soviet sphere of in-
fluence in the post-Stalin era, mostly in the concern for
humanizing Marxism. In 1957. Bulgaria, the most "reliable"
of satellite countries, experienced a writer's revolt where
the theme of protest was freedom of expression surrounding
cultural heritage and tradition. In 1956, the Hungarians
finally revolted againsx their great and prolonged personal
insecurity, affronts to individual dignity and self respect
and humiliation of their national ego. The Hungarians wanted
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to eliminate entrenched Communist leadership, to introduce
greater freedom and democratic practices, to assure greater
legal protection against arbitrary persecution and to
create a political instrument that would draw the population
together in the management of its own affairs. In October,
1957, Moscow sent troops to bring order and control the
revolution. After several weeks of confusion and dying,
the fighting was over and Hungary was poorer not only by
her dead, but also by 160,000 refugees, mainly students
and workers who had fled the country. The dictatorship
of the Communist Party was re-established and all gains of
the revolution were liquidated, one-by-one.
Hungary was striving for national independence, social
emancipation and political democracy in 1956. Czechoslovakia
had the same goals and objectives in 1968,
In 1962, the Czech government began hearing demands
from intellectuals and young Communists to bring Czechoslo-
vakia out of the ideological ice age. They wanted and
demanded intellectual and political freedom. In the
economic arena, there was worker dissatisfaction and con-
fusion which brought industrial labor productivity down.
In agriculture, production fell, shortages grew and
inflationary pressures developed. By 1963» the political,
ideological, intellectual and economic problems escalated
and escaped control of Novotny's regime. According to the
Czech writer, Novemesky, "the people had no trust, con-
fidence, understanding or loyalty." Then the call came
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from Communists, rather than ant i -Communists, seeking to
reform the Party back to Marxism and Leninism.
The fundamental split between orthodox Stalinist
intepreters of Marxism-Leninism and the new generation of
socialists was the definition of justice and freedom and
the concepts of the right to dissent, the unhampered flow
of ideas and the capability of each national party to make
its own decisions. How similar this is to today's attitudes
in Ukraine and the Central Asian Republics.
Under Dubcek, Czechoslovakia began a process of
intellectual, ideological, spiritual and human evolution
that gradually led him along the path of "humanizing
Marxism." The people and the government attempted to
synthesize socialist concepts of social economic justice
with the West's traditions of political, cultural and
scientific freedom. Dubcek maintained he was working to-
wards socialism "with a human face" under the purest form
of Marx and Lenin ideology. Brezhnev, however, thought
Dubcek' s actions were "socialist treason."
On 20 August 1968, Soviet, Polish, East German, Hungarian
and Bulgarian troops crossed the Czech border to put an
end to "dissident foolishness." Several interesting things
then evolved.
We know in general terms that deep dissension had arisen
within the Soviet establishment over the manner in which the
Czech problem had been handled. Many diplomats in Moscow
believed that Red Army leaders were sympathetic to the Czech
**7

cause and were therefore reluctant to order their troops
to open fire. The point to "be made here is that there
appeared to be feelings, however small within the Soviet
Army, for the concerns over human rights and civil liberties
over oppressed minorities. If this was the case, how
effective would such an invasion be tomorrow with a Soviet
Army made up of ^0-50 percent cultural and ethnic minorities
that were striving in their homelands for the same freedoms
as their "enemies?"
The most powerful and emotional reaction against the
invasion came from Communists of all persuasions. For
example, the Czech cause won support from the powerful
Italian Communist Party, the largest in Western Europe.
The British, Swiss, Belgian and Scandinavian parties joined
in denunciation of the invasion, and the big French Party
was rocked by its greatest internal crisis to date when it
forced thru a resolution condemning the attack. This
consistency of denunciation seems to indicate that inter-
national Party philosophy toward satisfying human needs
and nationalistic goals within the constraints of Marx/
Lenin ideology, is inconsistent with the prevailing attitudes
and concepts in Moscow. Again, presupposing that this is
the case, how might another country's political, social
and overall nationalistic efforts influence Ukrain, Uzbek,
or Azerbaijan Republics attempts at political autonomy and
emphasis on national and individual growth and development?
i+8

Two years after the invasion the Czech defiance of
Soviet dictates, a return to political, economic and
cultural oppression, had not ended. And today, "the
spirit of the Prague Spring is far from dead and the Soviet
Union has been unable to solve the fundamental problem
it faces not only in Czechoslovakia but in all of Eastern
Europe." (35, P-383)
F . SUMMARY
From the preceding review of contemporary economic,
political, and social repression in the second largest
Soviet Republic (the Ukraine) and the review of Moscow's
Russification efforts and attitudes in the Central Asia
Republics it becomes apparent that given a population
growth rate differential, especially in the 18 year old
age group, the Soviet military will perhaps experience a
mighty task in organizing, educating and training a force
composition of nearly one half ethnic and cultural minorities
The task of building and sustaining high levels of combat
readiness begins to appear insurmountable when one considers
not only the obvious language barrier in the organizational
structure, but also the prevailing attitudes, beliefs and
value systems brought into the organization by the new
recruit from his environment, i.e., his homeland's attempts
at nationalism, emphasis on cultural tradition and new




Compounding the problem of building and sustaining
high levels of combat readiness to repel aggression on
the international scene, Moscow must also consider the
traditional role of the army to suppress internal unrest.
It would seem apparent that as the country's ethnic com-
position changes, the army's reliability as a domestic
police force will perhaps diminish. Consider an internal
policing action with objectives similar to the Czech
invasion. With large numbers of non-Europeans in high
priority units, language differentials and an undercurrent
flow of the idea of basic human rights for all, one might
expect an inevitable decline in a unit's efficiency with
ethnic rivalry among soldiers taking its toll. It is
extremely doubtful that a multi -ethnic unit would be quite
as enthusiastic as a wholly Russian unit about say, firing
on a group of Armenian student demonstrators.
The next section will summarize affects of regional
population growth rate differentials with respect to the
composition and anticipated effectiveness, using traditional





"The Soviet Armed Forces vividly express the indivisible
unity of the working people, the "brotherhood of nations
achieved in the USSR and the atmosphere of friendship and
cooperation reigning in the country. The servicemen are
proud of the achievements of their Motherland and realizing
their high responsibility for its defense against aggressors
they persistently improve their skill and increase the
combat readiness of units and subunits. Constant strength-
ening of ties with the people is the most important feature
in the development and perfection of an army of a socialist
state. The very existence of the Soviet Army, which under
the leadership of the Communist Party draws its strength
from the people, is impossible without vital and unbreakable
connection and unity with the working people."
Colonel N. Sedov
Soviet Army
A. THE POTENTIAL FOR SIGNIFICANT MINORITY DISCRIMINATION
IN THE SOVIET MILITARY
The analysis behind the demographic changes confronting
the Soviet Union thru the end of this century seem to
indicate an environment, particularly in the Soviet Armed
Forces, that is exactly opposite from the words expressed
by Colonel Sedov. That is, as Moscow and the Communist
Party continue to repress the republics' moves at national-
istic attempts, to infringe on the personal rights and
freedoms of the numerous cultural and ethnic groups, and
to perpetuate attempts at country-wide Russification, there
appears to be less and less brotherhood among the nations
and very little real friendship, trust, loyalty and
cooperation among the Soviet people.
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In the light of anticipated population growth rate
differentials, especially the increases expected in the
non-European republics, the CPSU, it would seem, should
understand, then operationalize a "better response to the
cultural demands of its people. Does the Soviet Government
expect that continued policies aimed at acculturating her
republics toward more Russian-like values and norms will
solve or even ameliorate the future cultural and ethnic
differences? Do the Soviets realize that culture refers
to the cumulative deposit of a peoples knowledge, experience,
meanings, beliefs, attitudes, religion, hierarchies of
status and concepts of self? Do they realize that culture
manifests itself not only in patterns of language and
thought, but in forms of activity and behavior, and that
these patterns become models for common adaptive acts and
styles of expressive behavior? It would appear that they
don't have a realistic concept of culture and cannot
appreciate the difficulties of intercultural communication.
Further, it would seem that continued attempts to rely on
the strength of the political system and Communist ideology,
as it is currently intepreted, cannot force or even subtly
convince a nation and its people to give up years of
heritage, tradition, custom, values and norms. Amalrik,
points out that Soviet leaders must realize that the
various nationality groups are striving to preserve their
national culture and customs within the range of the
existing system. They are also concerned with enlarging
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their freedom of creativity and full self-expression and
actively seek to prevent further persecution of people
for political, religious, social or philosophical opinions.
Continued efforts of national, group and individual
persecution and overall attempts at minority Russification
will perhaps have short term societal affects with current
population distribution patterns and most certainly have
widespread undesirable consequences in future distribution
trends, especially in the Soviet military.
B. WHAT CAN WE PREDICT MIGHT HAPPEN?
Based strictly on the number of available 18 year olds,
the percentage of military recruits who are non-Europeans
will rise to nearly 2>Q-kQ percent by the year 2000. The
proportion of non-Europeans may be even higher if, as
expected, labor shortages in the general economy force
Moscow to exempt many draft age Russians from military
service. In any case, it will be just about impossible
for the army to continue its present practice of assigning
non-Europeans to low priority units (e.g. transportation,
supply, construction) and packing the high priority units
(e.g. Strategic Rocket Forces) with Europeans. If permitted
such assignment policies would create ethnically mixed
units that would experience not only language differentials
and inefficiencies, but also import from the external
environment feelings and actual actions of ethnic
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discrimination and hatred. Inadequacies in unit efficiency,
morale, team effort and cohesion may be predicted, even
expected.
The Soviets could take other steps to ameleorate their
problems. Among these are increasing the use of women,
a possible reduction in the size of the rear service and
support units, decreasing the size of their armed forces,
increasing the period of service obligation or improving
retention statistics. Except for the decision to decrease
the size of the military organization, these steps are
anticipated to have only marginal impact. Except in Central
Asian republics, women are currently fully employed in the
civilian economy and would not be available in large
numbers. A decrease in the size of the rear services and
support units can only be accomplished by an increase in
efficiency to a level for which the Soviet system is not
known. Increasing the service time will produce short
term, positive increases in enlisted capability, but by
no means compensate for the quantative/qualitive decline
in manpower or keep pace with the rapid modernization
of equipment
.
C. SOVIET MINORITY DISCRIMINATION: ITS IMPACT FOR THE
WEST AND THIRD WORLD POWERS
Recognizing weakness in Soviet military response due to
the effects of minority dissent and majority reaction has
certain implications for the West. In long range strategic
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and tactical planning obvious military advantage can be
obtained by capitalizing on the potential issues of
distrust, lack of group cohesiveness, ineffective and
inaccurate communication and poor training resulting from
racial tension and conflict. One might expect considerable
restructuring of existing military districts, attempts at
returning to military federalism, antagonistic political
pressures, the genesis of human resource development
programs and perhaps large capital outlays in new or
reprioritized national budgets.
Additionally, world position and respect of the Soviet
Union may be challenged by those non-Western countries
whose populations have strong ethnic affinities with
resistive nationalities in the USSR. Those countries
would include Rumania (Moldavians) , Iran (Tadzhiks and
Azerbaijans), and Turkey (Meskhetian Turks and the entire
Soviet Turkic population)
.
Military protest demonstration would also discredit
the Soviet model of international integration everywhere
in the Third World and would undermine the regime's
credibility as a spokesman for the oppressed nationalities
in non-communist countries.
D. HOW ALL OF THIS GOT STARTED
Lenin suspected that in the long run Communism would
prove out to be a stronger force than nationalism. He
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disagreed with many of his fellow Bolsheviks, who argued
that nationalist sentiments must be crushed by force.
Instead, Lenin insisted that the state should "not permit
the overriding of any one nationality by another either in
any particular region or in any branch of public affairs."
He argued that education was the key, that the sooner the
Soviet Union's non-Russians became literate, the sooner
local loyalities would give way to the creation of a new
multinational species called "Soviet man." So, Lenin
endorsed the use of native languages as the most rapid
means of achieving literacy - fluency in Russian could
wait
.
Lenin, miscalculated however. His policy has not led
to a Soviet man; instead it triggered a renaissance of
national cultures throughout the Soviet Union - language,
literature even ethnic awareness. The more that the
national groups learn about their own cultures, the less
they like the idea of the Russians controlling their
homelands
.
E. HOW MIGHT ALL OF THIS END?
The implications of a language barrier and other forms
of cultural and ethnic oppression that exist now and the
magnitude of those differences projected for the future
will certainly tax the imagination, the creative, intellectual,
and budgetary abilities of the Soviet Government, military
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authorities, sociologists and any disciplines schooled
in human resource management and development, if there are
any. Suffice it to say that significant leadership and
management problems will surely arise, coupled with an
overall decrease in military effectiveness if this





"MILITARY SERVICE AND SERVICEMEN'S RIGHTS
Colonel N Vladimrsky
In accordance with the USSR Constitution and USSR Law
on Universal Military Service all male citizens of the
Soviet Union without distinction of race or nationality,
attitude toward religion, education, domicile, social or
property status are obliged to perform military service in
the ranks of the Armed Forces.
Military service comprises active service and service
in the reserve
.
Male citizens who have reached draft age (18 years) are
called up for military service. Young men can enter
military educational establishments at the age of 17- For
soldiers and sergeants of the Army, coastal units and the
air arm of the Navy, frontier and interior service troops
a two year term of service is established. For seamen and
petty officers of the naval support coastal units and
frontier guard naval units the length of service is three
years. Soldiers, seamen, sergeants and starshinas with
higher education perform one and a half years' active
service
.
Call up for military service takes place twice a year:
in May-June and November-December.
NOTE : Starshinas, is comparable to the rank of Master
Sergeant, First Sergeant or Sergeant-Ma j or.
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As prescribed by the Law on Universal Military Service
women of the USSR aged from 19 to ^0 with medical or some
other special education may be registered for military
service in peacetime, summoned for training assemblies or
enlisted as volunteers for active service. In wartime,
according to the decision of the USSR Council of Ministers,





Basic Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
In 1977 » Moscow produced and promulgated a new constitu-
tion for the peoples and republics of the USSR. The
following are excerpts from the preamble of that constitu-
tion and key articles indicating at least the intent of
equal human rights.
".
. .the Soviet state has become a state for all
people . . . the well-being of the people is rising
steadily, and increasing favorable conditions are taking
shape for the all-round development of the personality. . .
the Soviet people have emerged through the drawing together
of all social strata and on the basis of the juridical
and actual equality of all nations and nationalities. . .
the political system assures the effective administration
of all social affairs, the increasingly active participa-
tion of the working people in state affairs, and the
combination of genuine human rights and freedoms with a
sense of civic duty."
ARTICLE 20 In accordance with the communist ideal, the
free development of each is the condition of the free
development of all, the Soviet state strives to expand
citizens' actual possibilities to develop and use their




ARTICLE 27 The state is concerned with protecting
and increasing society's spiritual values, and for using
them widely to raise the cultural level of the Soviet
people
.
In the USSR, the development of professional and
popular art is given every encouragement.
ARTICLE 3^ Citizens of the USSR are equal before the
law, regardless of their origin, social status and property,
nationality and race, sex, education, language, attitude
toward religion, type or character of occupation, place of
residence or other particulars.
Equal rights of Soviet citizens are insured in all
fields of economic, political, social and cultural life.
ARTICLE 36 Soviet citizens of different nationalities
and races have equal rights.
The exercise of these rights is insured by the policy
and comprehensive development and drawing together of all
nations and nationalities of the USSR, education of
citizens in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist
internationalism, and the opportunity to use one's native
tongue and the languages of other peoples of the USSR.
Any direct or indirect restriction of citizen's rights
or establishment of direct or indirect privileges for
citizens on grounds of race or nationality, or similarly
any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness, hostility
or contempt is punishable by law.
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ARTICLE ^6 Citizens of the USSR have the right to use
the achievements of culture.
This right is insured by public access to the values
of our own and world culture preserved in state and public
repositories, by the development and balanced distribution
of cultural and educational institutions on our territory,
and by the expression of cultural exchanges with foreign
countries
.
ARTICLE 50 In conformity with the interests of the
working people and for the purpose of strengthing the
socialist system, citizens of the USSR are guaranteed
freedom of speech, press, assembly, meetings, street
processions and demonstrations. The exercise of these
political freedoms is insured by putting public buildings,
streets and squares at the disposal of the working people
and their organizations, by the broad dissemination of
information, and by the opportunity to use press, television
and radio.
ARTICLE 52 Freedom of conscience, that is, the right
to profess any religion and perform religious rites or not
to profess any religion, and to conduct atheistic propaganda,
is recognized for all citizens of the USSR. Incitement of
hostility and hatred on religious grounds is prohibited.
In the USSR, the church is spearated from the state,
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THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics consists of 15
republics. Ten of these are subdivided into Oblasts
(Regions) , Krays (Territories) , Autonomous Soviet Socialist
Republics (S.S.R.) or Autonomous Oblasts. In the largest
republic, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
(S.F.S.R.) some of the Oblasts and Krays are further sub-
divided into Autonomous Oblasts and Nationality Okrugs
(Districts) .









"Non-European" nationalities refer to people in the
republics of:
8) Uzbek S.S.R. 12) Georgian S.S.R.
9) Kazakh S.S.R. 13) Tadzhik S.S.R.
10) Armenian S.S.R. 1*0 Turkmen S.S.R.
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